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Summary
The analysis and evaluation of reliability measures using time-
varying Markov models has gained in importance for computer
architectures that use standby redundancy or can be repaired. The task
of generating these models for arbitrary Processor-Memory-Switch (PMS)
interconnection structures, however, is tedious and prone to human
error due to the large number of states and transitions involved in any
reasonable structure. Existing programs that evaluate these models
make the followingassumptions:
a) The case analysis of success states of the system has been carried
out. Such analysismust be done manually.
b) The input to the program is either an intermediaterepresentation
(e.g.Fault Tree), or the state transitionmatrix (STM).
This is the first attempt to (a) identify and analyze the problems
involved in the automatic generation of reliability and availability
Markov models for arbitrary interconnection structures at the PMS
level, and (b) generate and implement solutions to these problems.
This work will automate the task o_ case analysis and generation of the
STM in the computation of the reliability and availability of PMS
structures. The advantages of such an approach are (a) utility to a
larger class of users, not necessarily expert in reliability analysis,
and (b) a lower probability of human error in the computation.
A program named ARM (Automated Reliability Modeling) will be
constructed as a research vehicle. ARM will accept as inputs:
a) The interconnection graph of the PMS structure.
b) The behavior of the PMS structure components in terms of their
internal communication structure, and their distributions and
corresponding parameters of performance and reliability.
c) The groups of redundant components (e.g. processor triads).
d) A succinct statement of the operational requirements on the PMS
structure in the form of a modified Booleanexpr_ssion.
i
The operational requirements in the case of a redundant multiproeessor
may be, for example, "two processor triads and two memory triads". The
communication structures in the PMS system (e.g. buses) will be
considered in addition to the explicitly stated requirements to
determine how the interconnection structure affects the system
reliability and availability. The output of the ARM program will be
tlle reliability or availability STM. The STM will be formulated for
direct use by evaluation programs.
ii
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1. Introduction
Computer systems are growing in complexity and sophistication as
multiprocessor and distributed computer systems are coming into
widespread use to achieve higher performance and reliability. This
growth is being assisted by the availability of successively more
complex building blocks. This trend has increased the importance of
fault-tolerance and system reliability as design parameters. Thus the
computation of system reliability measures has become one of the system
design tasks. Several efforts have been reported in the literature and
are in progress to make the task of computing system reliability
measures easier and more efficieht by providing designers with
reliability evaluation tools.
The analysis and evaluation of system reliability for complex
computer systems is very tedious and prone to error even for
experienced reliability analysts. With the exception of the ADVISER
program, discussed in Section 1.2, existing software tools usually
assume an understanding of reliability analysis techniques and
therefore are more in the nature of computational aids once the
preliminary system decomposition and analysis has been manually
achieved. Although ADVISER does not make this assumption it uses
combinatorial techniques and is therefore limited in the complexity of
systems and fault types it can analyze.
More advanced techniques are required to analyze computer
architectures that use standby redundancy, can be repaired, and are
susceptible to transient or intermittent faults. One possibility is a
time-varylng Markov model. The advantages offered by time-varying
Markov models are that they are in widespread use among reliability
analysts and several programs, discussed in Section 1.2, have been
developed to solve them. However time-varying Markov models can not
analyze concurrent events. For example, a fault that arrives while the
system is reconfiguring itself around a previous fault would be
represented by a transition to a state where two faults are present.
2This new state would not take into account the time thesystem already
spent reconfiguring from the first fault.
Another possibility is the extended stochastic Petri net (ESPN)
described in [Dugan 84]. The advantages offered by the ESPN is that it
can analyze concurrent events and model systems at a lower level of
detail than time-varying Markov models. The ESPN can be concurrent
because its 'tokens' can be simultaneously enabled to move concurrently
at independent transition times. The low level modeling capability is
due to mechanisms such as queues and counters that can simulate the
algorithm of the process being modeled. To solve an ESPN analytically
it must be converted to a time-varying Markov model. This conversion
is not possible if tokens are moving concurrently at independent
transition times tha% are not exponentially distributed, because this
makes the process non-Markovian (i.e. the transition probabilities
depend on past states). In general an ESPN must be solved by
simulation.
Simulations can include any level of detail, and are thus flexible,
but many repetitions of the simulation are needed to ensure accuracy.
For example, say the probability of failure P is going to be estimated
with a relative error no more than 10% within a confidence interval of
95%. The relative error E is defined as:
JP-PI
• . E - (1.1)
P
A ^
where P is the estimate of P. P is defined as:
^
P = F / N (I.2)
where F is the number of failures observed and N is the sample size. "
Then an expression for N must be found such that:
Pr(E _ .I) = .95 (1.3)
Substituting (1.1) into (1.3) and multiplying the inequality by P
gives:
^
Pr(IP - PI _ .Ie) = .95 (1.4)
Substituting (1.2) into (1.4) and multiplying the inequality by N
gives:
Pr(Ie - NP I _ .INP) = .95 (1.5)
Substituting _ for NP in (1.5) gives:
er(IF- lJl _ .I_) = .95 (1.6)
The inequality in (1.6) can be expressed as:
Pr(.9_ _ F S 1.1_) = .95 (1.7)
If N is large and P is small F is approximately Poisson distributed
with mean _ = NP and (1.7) can be expressed as:
1.1_J l_le-_
- .95 (I.8)
i=.9_ i!
Therefore in life critical applications where a probability of failure
in the order 10-9 is required, approximately 3.8 x 1011 simulation
repetitions are necessary! In general those applications require an
analytic approach.
It is the intent of this paper to explore the issues in the automatic
generation of reliability and availability Markov models for arbitrary
interconnection structures at the Processor-Memory-Switch (PMS) level.
The result of this effort wi!l be implemented and experimentally
validated in the ARM (_utomated _eliability Modeling) program which
will accept the PMS interconnection structure and a simple set of
operational requirements on the structure. The program will attempt to
efficiently analyze, using the divide-and-conquer methodology, the
various system states based on the interconnection structure and the
operational requirements.
The output of the ARM program will be a file containing the
reliability or availability state transition matrix. The output format
will vary depending on the program to evaluate the state transition
matrix. The evaluation programs whose format the user will be able to
specify are: SURE, HARP, and ARIES (described in Section 1.2).
4The following sections will present a brief background on reliability
calculation at the PMS level using time-varying Markov models.
Previous work in the generation and evaluation of reliability models is
surveyed. The goals for ARM wil! be stated and compared with those of
previous efforts. The final section will present the Organization of
this paper.
1.1 Background
Present day computer systems can be viewed at varying levels of
detail, and therefore so can the process of designing and analyzing
them. Four levels were defined by Siewiorek, Bell, and Newell
[Siewiorek 82a]. These range from the circuit level, through the logic
and programming levels, to the PMS level. The PMS level view of
digital systems is one where the primitives are processors, memories,
switches, transducers, etc. as opposed to the logic level where the
primitives may be gates, registers, multiplexers, etc.
Hardware components are susceptible to permanent, transient, and
intermittent faults as discussed in [Siewiorek 82b]. A fault is an
erroneous state of hardware or software resulting from a physical
change in the hardware or interference from the environment. Permanent
or hard faults are continuous and stable, and result from an
irreversible physical change. Transient faults result from temporary
environmental conditions. Intermittent faults are occasionally present
due to unstable hardware, or varying hardware or software states (for
example, as a function of load or activity).
Fault-tolerant computer systems can be affected by a limited set of
°
faults without interruptions in their operation. Some computer systems
achieve fault-tolerance by using redundant groups of components to
perform the same operations. The system must determine which is the
correct output using diagnostics or majority voting. Siewiorek and
Swarz [Siewiorek 82b] discuss the various redundancy techniques, the
more relevant ones are defined below.
STATIC REDUNDANCY - In static redundancy faults are masked through a
majority vote involving a fixed group of redundant components. Thus,
when the masking redundancy is exhausted by component faults, any
further faults will cause errors at the output.
DYNAMIC REDUNDANCY - In dynamic redundancy faults are not masked but
the faulty components are detected° isolated, and reconfigured out of
the system. The faulty components may be replaced by spares if
available.
HYBRID REDUNDANCY - In hybrid redundancy faults are masked through a
majority vote involving a group of redundant components that is
reconfigured when spares are available. Thus, when the redundancy is
exhausted by component faults, any further faults 'will cause errors at
the output.
ADAPTIVE VOTING - In adaptive voting faults are masked through a
majority vote involving a variable group of redundant components
without spares. Faulty components are reconfigured out of the system
by excluding them from the voting process and the voter threshold
adjusted to reflect a smaller number of components. Thus, when the
redundancy is exhausted by component faults, any further faults that
occur will cause errors at the output.
ADAPTIVE HYBRID - In adaptive hybrid faults are masked through a
majority vote involving a variable group of redundant components that
is reconfigured when spares are available. If spares are not available
faulty components are reconfigured out of the system by excluding them
from the voting process and adjusting the voter threshold. Thus, when
_ the masking redundancy is exhausted by component faults, any further
faults that occur before a faulty component is replaced by a spare or
° reconfigured out of the voting process will cause errors at the output.
For example, a triad is a group of 3 components that use hybrid
redundancy to tolerate at least one fault. If a triad recovers from a
6fault by replacing the faulty component with a spare it can then
tolerate a second fault. Recovery is the process of detecting,
isolating, and reconfiguring the faulty component out of the system.
The fault coverage of a component is the probability that the system
can survive a fault in this component and successfully recover. If the
system can always recover it has a "perfect" coverage of I.
Reliability measures are defined in terms of probabilities because
the failure processes in hardware components are non-deterministic.
Siewiorek and Swarz [Siewiorek 82b] discuss these various measures, the
more relevant ones are defined below.
RELIABILITY - The reliability, R(t), of a system as a function of time
t is the conditional probability that the system has survived the
interval [0, t] given that it was operational at time zero. It is a
non'increasing function whose initial value is one.
MTTF - The MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) is the expected time of the
first system failure assuming a new (perfect) system at time zero.
AVAILABILITY - The availability, A(t), of a system as a function of
time t ks the probability that the system is operational at that
instant of time t.
If the limit of A(t) exists as t goes to infinity, it expresses the
expected fraction of time that the system is available to perform
useful computations. Availability is typically used as a figure of
merit in systems in which service can be delayed or denied for short
periods to perform preventive maintenance or repair without serious
consequences. The availability is important in the computation of
system life-cycle costs.
Reliability is used to describe systems in which repair is typically
infeasible such as aerospace applications. The MTTF can be derived
from R(t) as follows:
7MTTF = f R(t) dt
o
The most commonly used reliability function for a single component is
based on a Poisson process with an exponential distribution. This is
called the exponential reliability function, and has the form:
-At
R(t) = e
where A is the hazard or failure rate. The failure rate is a constant
which reflects the reliability of the component and for highly reliable
components is usually expressed in failures per million hours. The
exponential reliability function is used when the failure rate is time-
independent, such as when components do not age. It is often observed
that, after a burn-in period, permanent faults in electronic components
follow a relatively constant failure rate. The MTTF for the
exponential reliability function has the form:
I
! MTTF = -
Many other reliability functions have been formulated. The second
most common reliability function is based on the Weibull distribution.
This is called the Weibull reliability function, and has the form:
R(t) = e
•where i is the scale parameter and e is the shape parameter(other
reparameterizedforms are also common). It is equivalentto the
exponentialfunctionwhen e is one. The Weibull reliabilityfunction
•is used when the failurerate is time-dependent. Permanentfaults for
componentsthat age can be described using an increasingfailurerate
(alphagreater than one) and in this ease the system is not as good as
new when repair takes place. Data presentedin [McConnel81] indicates
that transientfaults follow a decreasingfailurerate (alpha less than
one).
8The failure processes of different components will be assumed to be
independent of each other. This assumption is not strictly true, such
as when electrical, mechanical, or' thermal conditions in one component
affect other components in its proximity. However it is close enough
in practice to be used to simplify the analysis.
The state of a system represents all that must be known to describe
the system at any instant. 'As the system changes, such as when
components fail or are repaired, so does its state. These changes of
state are called state transitions. If all possible states are assumed
to be known a discrete-state system model is used; if this assumption
is not made a continuous-state system model is used. If the state
transition times are assumed to be restricted to some multiple of a
give n time interval a discrete-time system model is used. If it is
assumed that state transitions cart occur at any time a continuous-time
system model is used. Most systems can be classified aceordlng to
their state space and time parameter as
a) discrete-state and discrete-time
b) discrete-state and continuous-time
c) continuous'state and discrete-time
d) continuous-state and continuous-time
For a discrete-state system a state transition diagram (STD) may be
drawn. The transition diagram is a directed graph. The nodes
correspond to system states and the directed arcs indicate allowable
state transitions. Each arc has a label that identifies the
distribution of the conditional probability that the system will go
from the originating node to the destination node of that directed arc
given the previous history of the system and that the system was
initially at the originating node. The _ label used depends on the
distribution. For example, the label could be the hazard rate for the _
exponential distribution, the scale and shape parameters for the
Weibull distribution, or the filename of a histogram for more general
distributions.
If transitions are allowed from failed states to operational states
then the STD is an Availability graph and A(t) may be obtained from it.
R(t) may be obtained by specifically disallowing failed to working
state transitions from the STD thus making it a Reliability graph.
A Reliability graph of a triad is given in Figure I-I. In this model
it is assumed that the system h_s a perfect coverage of I. The
horizontal transitions represent fault arrivals. These follow an
exponential distribution and consequently I represents the constant
hazard rate. The coefficients of i represent the number of working
processors are being actively used in the configuration. The vertical
transitions represent recovery from a fault. These follow a general
distribution and consequently _ represents the filename of the
histogram defining the distribution. There is a race between the
occurrence of a second fault ana the removal of the first. If the
second fault wins the race, then system failure occurs. If the removal
of the first fault wins the race, then the system reconfigures into a
simplex (i.e. only uses one of the two working components). Unless
otherwise noted in the state descriptions, all working processors are
being actively used in the configuration.
Key: State Description
I 3 working
2 2 working
3 system faile(_
4 2 working, uses I
5 system failed
Figure I-I: Reliability Graph of a Triad with I Spare
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The information conveyed by the STD is often summarized in a square
matrix called the state transition matrix (STM). The STM element in
row i and column j is the labe! in the arc from state i to state j.
The terminology used in this paper to denote the various types of
time-varying Markov models, and the assumptions they are based on are
defined below. The hierarchy of time-varying Markov models is
illustrated in Figure I-2.
TIME-VARYING MARKOV PROCESS - A stochastic process whose future state
depends only upon the present state, and not upon the history that led
to its present state.
HOMOGENEOUS MARKOV MODEL - A model that uses a pure Markov process
whose state transition probabilities are time-independent. For the
continuous-time homogeneous Markov process this implies that the state
transition times follow an exponential distribution. This model is
discussed in [Chung 67] and [Romanovsky 70].
SEMI-MARKOV MODEL - A model that uses a generalization of the pure
Markov process whose state transition probabilities depend upon the
local time spent in the present state. For the continuous-tlme semi'
Markov process this implies that the state transition times do not
follow an exponential distribuCion, they might follow a Weibull
distribution or any other distribution. This model is discussed and
applied to computer systems in [White 84].
NON-HOMOGENEOUS MARKOV MODEL - A model that uses a generalization of
the pure Markov process whose state transition probabilities depend
upon the global time. For the continuous-time non-homogeneous Markov
process this implies that the state transition times do not follow an
exponential distribution. Often _hey are assumed to follow a Weibull
distribution, but they can follow any other distribution. This model
is discussed and applied to computer systems in [Trivedi 81].
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Time-Varying Markov
/ I \--/ \
Homogeneous Semi-Markov Non-Homogeneous
(tlme-lndependent) (local time-dependent) (global time-dependent)
Figure I-2: Hierarchy of Time-Varying Markov Models
The probability of being in a particular state for a discretelstate
and continuous-time Markov model can be expressed with a differential
equation. The set of simultaneous differential equations that describe
these models are called the _continuous-time Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations. For homogeneous Markov models these equations can be solved
using matrix or Laplace transformations.
If the state transition probabilities are time-dependent it may be
quite difficult to obtain explicit solutions to the continuous-time
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. To obtain the exact probability of
reaching a state through a particular path of transitions requires the
solution of a multiple integral, where each integral represents the
probability of making one of the transitions in the path. Often the
integrals are approximated using numerical integration techniques
[Stiffler 79]. An alternative method is to approximate the continuous-
time process with dlscrete-time equivalents [Siewiorek 82b]. The major
• difficulty with the second method is that many transition rates that
are effectively zero in the continuous'time process assume small but
nonzero probabilities in a discrete-time process.
1.2 Previous Work
There are several p_ograms that use time-varying Markov models to
evaluate the reliability and/or availability of systems that use
. standby redundancy or can be repaired, and are susceptible to hard,
transient, and intermittent faults, such as CARE III, ARIES, SURE,
SURF, and HARP. All these programs can evaluate both the reliability
and availability of a system, except for CARE III which can only
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evaluate the reliability. Except for CARE III, they all have as one of
the system specification methods the state transition matrix.
CARE III (Computer-_ided Reliability Estimation), described in
[Bavuso 84], can evaluate the reliability of systems that use
reconfiguration to tolerate component faults but do not repair the
faulty components. It uses a behavioral decomposition/aggregatlon
solution technique described in [Trivedi 81]. This technique assumes
that the fault-occurrence behavior is composed of relatively infrequent
events while the fault-handling behavior is composed of relatively
frequent events. The fault-handling behavior is separately analyzed
using a fixed semi-Markov model that can use exponentlal and uniform
distributions. The fault occurrence behavior is analyzed using an
aggregate non-homogeneous Markov model that can use exponential and
Weibull distributions, The fault handling behavior is reflected by
parameters in the aggregate non-homogeneous Markov model. Numerical
integration techniques are used to solve these time-varying Markov
models. The fault-occurrence behavior is specified using extended
fault trees, which are automatically converted to the non-homogeneous
Markov model. The fault-handling behavior is specified by providing
the transition parameters of the fixed semi-Markov model. Therefore
state transition matrices can not be accepted as input directly. CARE
III was developed at Raytheon, it is written in FORTRAN 77, and runs on
a Cyber or a VAX.
ARIES (Automated Reliability _nteractive Estimation _ystem),
described in [Makam 82], is restricted to homogeneous Markov models.
The system can be specified using a state transition matrix, or as a
series of independent subsystems each containing identical modules that
are either active or serve as spares. It uses a matrix transformation
solution technique that assumes distinct eigenvalues for the state
transition matrix. It was developed at UCLA and runs on a VAX.
Butler [Butler 84] describes a program named SURE (Semi-Markov
_nreliability Range Evaluator) which evaluates the unreliability upper
13
and lower bounds of semi-Markov models. It uses new mathematical
theorems proven in [White 84] and [Lee 85]. These theorems provide a
means of bounding the probability of traversing a specific path in the
model within a specified time. By applying the theorems to every path
of the model, the probability of the system reaching any death state
can be determined within usually very close bounds. These theorems
assume that slow (with respect to the mission time) exponential
transitions describe the occurrence of faults, and fast general
transitions describe the.recovery process. Faults can be modeled as
permanent, transient, or intermittent. Its only input method is the
state transition matrix. SURE was developed at NASA's Langley Research
Center, it is written in VAX-11 Pascal, and runs under VAX/VMS.
SURF, described in [Landrault 78], can solve semi-Markov models that
use exponential distributions or non-exponential distributions that are
related to the exponential (e.g. Gamma, Erlang, etc.). The method of
stages [Cox 68] is used to produce a homogeneous Markov model. Matrix
transformations are used to obtain time-independent values, such as
MTTF and the limiting availability. The Laplace transform is used to
obtain time-dependent values, such as availability and reliability.
Written in PL/I, it runs on a IBM System/370 at the IBM research
facility in Yorktown Heights, New York. SURF was developed in
Toulouse, France.
For HARP (Hybrid Automated Reliability _redictor), described in
[Trlvedi 85], the state transition probabilities can have exponential,
uniform, Weibull, or general (i.e. histogram list must be provided)
distributions. _ If the state transition matrix is given by the user
HARP can only evaluate the availability of systems with constant repair
rates. HARP has several additional methods of specifying the fault-
occurrence behavior (e.g. fault trees), all of which are automatically
converted to a non'homogeneous Markov model. The fault-handling
behavior can also be specified by providing the transition parameters
of one of several models. The fault-handling models available are: an
extended stochastic Petri net, the CARE III model, the ARIES model, and
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the SURE model. It uses the same behavioral decompositlon/aggregation
solution technique as CARE III, but the various models are solved in a
hybrid fashion. Time-varying Markov models are solved analytically
using numerical integration techniques, and extended stochastic Petri
nets are solved by simulation. It is written in FORTRAN 77 and runs on
a VAX. It is still under development at Duke University and Clemson
L
University.
An abstract specification langu_ge for Markov reliability models was
described by Butler [Butler 85]. The language has statements to
specify (a) the state space by defining the state variables and their
range, (b) the start state by the initial values of the state
variables, (c) the death states by a Boolean expression of the state
variables, and (d) the state transitions by a set of if-then rules that
define the possible transitions, their rates, and their destination
states all in terms of the state variables. This language has been
implemented in the ASSIST program to generate Markov reliability models
in the SURE input language. The algorithm used in ASSIST to generate
the model will be applicable with modifications to ARM as described in
Section 3. ASSIST was developed at NASA's Langley Research Center, it
is written in VAX-11 Pascal, and runs under VAX/VMS.
Kini [Kini 81] describes a program named ADVISER (Advanced
_nteractive _ymbolic Evaluator of Reliability) which automatically
generates symbolic reliability functions for PMS structures. It_
assumptions are: (a) all faults are permanent and stochastically
independent, (b) the PMS system has a perfect coverage, and (c) failed
components are not repaired and returned to a non-faulty state. Its
primary input is the interconnection graph of the PMS structure. Other
program inputs describe the components of the PMS structure by their
types, reliability functions, internal port connections, and ability to
communicate with components of the same type. The program also takes
as input the requirements for the system, and its subsystems or
clusters, in the form of modified Boolean expressions. The methods
used in ADVISER for detecting PMS graph symmetries and tree structures
15
will also be applicable with modifications to ARM as described in
Section 3. ADVISER was developed at CMU, it is written in BLISS, and
runs on a PDP-10.
J
1.3 Motivation
The goal of this research and development effort is to provide the
computer architect a powerful and easy to use software tool that will
assume the burden of an advanced reliability analysis that considers
intermittent, transient, and permanent faults for computer systems of
high complexity and sophistication. The PMS level of computer system
description was selected because (a) it is the highest level view of
digital systems and therefore the easiest to specify, and (b) it is
well known to computer architects. The time-varying Markov model
technique of reliability and availability analysis was selected because
(a) it is powerful enough to accurately analyze most situations except
for concurrent events, and (b) it is in widespread use among
reliability analysts and several evaluation programs have been
developed.
Previous efforts have been limited in one of two ways. Most provided
a computational aid once the preliminary system decomposition and
reliability analysis had been manually achieved. Alternatively
computer systems of less complexity and sophistication were considered
without transient and intermittent faults.
1.4 Organization
The system description required to generate a reliability or
availability Markov model is described in Section 2. The problems
involved in the automatic generation of reliability and availability
Markov models are discussed in Section 3. Examples of automatically
generated Markov reliability models are presented in Section 4. A
summary of the research and a plan for its accomplishment are presented
in Section 5. The algorithms used by the ARM program are described in
Appendix A.
16
2. System Description
It is important to have a general system description method that will
accommodate new fault-tolerant techniques and system designs. This
section presents the system description method currently envisioned for E
the ARM program. The generality of this method needs to be
investigated to correct any deficiencies.
When calculating a reliability measure for an arbitrary system of
components, four items of information are necessary, namely:
a) The reliability behavior of the system components (Section 2.1).
b) The fault tolerant function of individual components or groups of
components in the system (Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
c) The communication paths that components in the system may use, and
which are the components that need to exchange information
(Sections 2.4 to 2.6).
d) The operational requirements placed on the system and its
subsystems (Sections 2.7 and 2.8).
Item (b) is the only one that is not necessary for some systems] The
ARM program will use eight input categories to obtain these items of
information for any arbitrary system. For some systems only three ARM
input categories are required to convey the information in (a), (c),
and (d). These minimum ARM input categories are: a reliability
description of the component types (Section 2.1), the interconneetion
structure (Section 2.4), and the system requirements (Section 2.8).
The following sections will discuss the purpose and necessity of the
input categories that provide the ARM program with these items of
information. The fina! section will give an example of how a
multiprocessor system can be specified using all the input categories
of the ARM program.
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2.1 Component Types
The first input category is a list describing the types of components
in the PMS structure. Components of the same type are assumed to be
identical in function and reliability. The concept of component types
is natural and reduces the system specification burden. The other
alternative would be to specify the characteristics of each particular
component.
Each type declaration will specify the coverage probability, and the
rates of the various failure, recovery, and repair processes for
components of that type. Rates will be specified by a probability
distribution and the parameters of that distribution. A rate may
follow more than one distribution as a function of the system state.
The function of the system state that determines the distribution of a
rate will be in the form of a modified Boolean expression as defined in
Section 2.8. A distribution can be exponential, Weibull, or general
(i.e. a histogram must be provided).
The nine classes of information a type declaration can contain are
defined below. Each type declaration must contain at least the first
two classes. Figure 2-I illustrates how the first seven classes are
Used in reliability models.
TYPE - The first class is the name of the component type.
HARD - The second class is the Hard failure rate _. Hard faults are
assumed to be caused by permanently damaged components that
continuously produce errors when exercised.
TRANSIENTS - The third class consists of two rates. One is the
transient failure rate _. Another is the transient duration rate 6,
that is the rate at which the transient stops producing errors. It is
assumed transients are not caused by or produce any permanent damage to
the components.
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INTERMITTENTS - The fourth class consists of three rates. One is the
intermittent failure rate _. Another is the intermittent benign rate
_, that is the rate at which an intermittent becomes benign or stops
producing errors. Last is the active rate e, that is the rate at which
an intermittent fault that had stopped producing errors becomes active
and starts producing errors once more. It is assumed intermlttents are
caused by permanently damaged components.
COVERAGE - The fifth class is the fault coverage C expressed as the
probability that the system can survive a fault in this type of
component and successfully recover'. This probability defaults to I.
Coverage has a great impact on t1_ereliability of a system. Therefore
it must be estimated very accurately using one or more of the
following: simulation, analytic methods, or fault injection
experiments.
REPAIR - The sixth class is the repair rate _, that is the rate at
which components of this type are repaired and returned to service.
Only if the repair rate is specified can the availability of the system
be modeled.
RECOVERY - The seventh class is the recovery rate p, that is the rate
at which the system can detect, isolate, and reconflgure from faults in
components of this type by using a shadow (a hot or powered up spare
that is imitating the active component).
SHADOW - The eighth class is the shadow activation rate o, that is the
rate at which the system can provide a shadow. A shadow is a spare
component that is performing all the functions of a redundant group of
active components with the exception that its output is not being used.
The purpose of shadows is to increase the recovery rate. An example of
this is the rate at which a memory module can be reloaded to shadow a
different memory triad. A shadow can be provided by changing the
redundant group that a hot or powered up spare is imitating, or by
powering up and activating a cold or unpowered spare.
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Key: State D_scription
I no faults
2 hard fault
3 transient fault
4 active intermittent fault
5 benign intermittent fault
6 correct fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration
7 incorrect fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration
Figure 2-I: Use of Component Type Information in Reliability Models
DEGRADATION - The ninth class is the degradation rate 8. That is the
rate at which the system can gracefully degrade by elimlnatlng'one"
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redundant group of components which are all of this type. A group is a
set of components performing the same operations such that the correct
output can be selected using diagnostics or majority vote. Degradation
is necessary when a group component fails, there are no spares to
replace it, and the number of these groups is above the minimum
requirements for the system. This is done because a group with a
failed component has a greater probability of failure (fewer group
components need to fail for the group not to meet its minimum
rcquirements), and if a group fails and there is no watchdog timer
(defined in Section 2.3) the system fails.
2.2 Redundant Groups
The second input category is a list that specifies any redundant
group of components in the system. A group is a set of components
performing the same operations such that the correct output can be
selected using diagnostics or majority vote. Each group declaration
will contain the maximum number of groups of this type, the group name,
the requirements, the type of components in the group, and if uslng
adaptive voting the name of the adapted group and the adaptive rate.
The adapted group is the group with the adjusted voter threshold. The
adaptive rate corresponds to the time involved in changing the voting
threshold.
Currently the redundancy technique used for a component is specified
by three things. One is whether it is part of a redundant group or
not. The other two are whether its recovery and adaptive rates are
zero or not. Table 2-I shows how each redundancy technique is
specified. This method of redundancy technique specification must be
extended so systems with new redundancy techniques can be described.
The semantics for this input category are the following. When a
component in a group using hybrid or adaptive hybrid redundancy fails,
there are no spares to replace it, and the number of these groups is
above the minimum requirements for the system, then the system
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gracefully degrades by eliminating the group. If the number of these
groups is not above the minimum requirements for the system and the
group uses adaptive hybrid redundancy, then the system reconfigures the
faulty component out of the voting process.
If there are shadows, then they are assumed to be evenlydistributed
among the groups. If a group has to be able to transmit to another
group, then each component of the transmitting group has to be able to
transmit to all the components of the receiving group. The reason for
the latter is so each component of the receiving group can do an
independent majority vote on the information from the transmitting
group.
REDUNDANT GROUP RECOVERY RATE ADAPTIVE RATE
STATIC REDUNDANCY yes zero zero
DYNAMIC REDUNDANCY no nonzero zero
HYBRID REDUNDANCY yes nonzero zero
ADAPTIVE VOTING yes zero nonzero
ADAPTIVE HYBRID yes nonzero nonzero
i
Table 2-I: Redundancy Technique Specification
2,3 System Watchdog Timers
The third input category is a list that specifies which (if any)
component type or group of components acts as a watchdog timer for the
system, and the rate at which the watchdog can restart the system. A
watchdog is assumed to have a timer that must be reset before it runs
out or the watchdog will restart the system. A watchdog decreases the
probability that multiple faults in a redundant group of components
will cause system failure.
22
Key:. State Description State Description
I 3 working 7 system failed
2 2 working 8 watchdog failed
3 system crashed 9 2 working, no watchdog
4 I working 10 system failed
5 2 working, uses I 11 2 working, uses I, no watchdog
6 system crashed 12 system failed
Figure 2-2: Reliability Graph of a Triad with a Watchdog
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The semantics for this input category are the following. If there is
no watchdog, and any group fails, then the system fails. If the
watchdog fails, and any group fails, then the system fails. In other
words, there has to be a watchdog for the system to survive a group
failure.
Adding a watchdog timer modifies the system model by preventing some
}
i states from being failure states and by creating new states. For
=!
!i example, if a watchdog with failure rate _ and system restart rate 0 is
ii! added to a triad the system model changes from the one in Figure I-I to
ili the one in Figure 2"2. In this new model it is assumed that the system
i has a perfect coverage of I and the failure of the watchdog wili not
i cause system failure. The watchdog prevents a system crash caused by
i the failure of two processing elements from causing system failure by
il restarting the system as a simplex without spares.
2'4 PMS Structure
The fourth input category is an interconnection list of the PMS
structure. It is assumed that critical components which are required
for the system to be operational must be able to communicate. The main
i purpose of the interconnection list is to analyze which componenti,i ' •
_ failures will prevent communication between critical components and
therefore cause system failure.
The interconnection list can also be used to detect which
substructures in the PMS graph are symmetrical in their component types
and neighboring components. Syc_etrical substructures are assumed to
be identical in function and reliability. Therefore the reliability
] models of symmetrical substructures are identical and only have to be
generated once. These models can then be duplicated and merged to
obtain the reliability model of the system.
Each component will have an interconnection declaration that
i specifies its type and neighboring components. Since the PMS graph is
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non-directed it is possible to completely specify an arc by its
occurrence in one interconnection declaration. However, it will be
noted that each arc must occur on two interconnection declarations.
The purpose of this redundancy is twofold. Firstly, inconsistencies
can be detected thus making the system specification less likely to
contain errors. Secondly, a reader of a system specification can more
easily comprehend the structure if the connection is made quite
expllcit with two-way links.
Although not within the scope of the current work, the system
specification could be further eased by a graphics based user friendly
interface. The interconnection list would then be provided by an input
interface that would accept a graphic description of the PMS structure,
Since this is not part of the current research and ARM could easily
accept its input from an interface program, this interface could be
generated independently by support personnel using tools such as the
Future Net program for the IBM PC. Such a graphics interface already
exists for the PERQ personal work stations at CMU.
2.5 Intracomponent Port Connections
i
The fifth input category is a list specifying the internal port
connectivity of some components and/or component types. The purpose of
the interna! port connectivity is to analyze which component failures
will prevent communication between critical components and therefore i
cause system failure. This information is needed to prevent the
reliability modeling program from assuming incorrect communication
paths through intermediate components to other components. Not taking
this behavior into account would lead to an optimistic evaluation of
the system reliability.
This input category is needed because it is impossible for a
reliability modeling program to have this knowledge for all the
component types that will be designed. Even if the PMS graph where
modified to be a directed graph, the program would still need to know
if information passed from A to B can be passed from B to C.
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If not specified, the default is for every port of a component to be
connected bidirectlonally to all other ports of the component. If the
internal port connectivity is specified, then for that component or
component type all port connections and their direction must be made
explioit. Each connection declaration contains the following
parameters:
VERTEX The specific components or component type whose port
i connections are being specified.
_: TRANSMITTER A transmitter port.of the VERTEX. It is specified by
_ the component or component type connected to it.
RECEIVER A port that receives from the previous transmitter
port. It is specified by the component or component
type connected to it.
r_
2.6 Intra Component-Type Communication
j,
it
!,! The majority of components of like type are passive and do not need
to communicate. Examples of passive components are memories, buses,
and Input/output transducers. Active or self-talklng components need
to exchange information amongst each other. Examples of active
_I components are processors, direct-memory-access device controllers, and
_J other "smart" controllers. If not specified the default is for
_ components to bepassive and not communicate with their own type.
The sixth input category is a list specifying the component types for
which communication between components_of like type is necessary. The
purpose of the intra component type communication list is to analyze
which component failures will prevent communication between critical
components that need to exchange information and therefore cause system
failure. This information is needed to prevent the reliability
modeling program from requiring communication paths between components
of the same type that never exchange information. Not taking this
behavior into account would lead to a pessimistic evaluation of the
system reliability.
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2.7 Component Clustering
The seventh input category is a list specifying which (if any)
components form clusters, that is subsystems with their own separate
requirements. If the cluster requirements are not met all the cluster
components fail but the system ma___yycontinue to operate depending on the
system requirements. The purpose of clusters is to represent the
dependencies that sometimes exist between components. Each cluster
declaration will contain the name of the cluster, its components, and
its requirements in the form of a modified Boolean expression as
defined in Section 2.8.
2.8 System Requirements
The eighth input category is a succinct statement of the minimum set
of critical component types and/or component groups which are required
for the system to be operational. Together they constitute a minimum
critical resource set (MCRS). The set is minimum in the sense that the
system may only function if a MCRS of components are functional
(depending on the status of other components in the structure). In
other words, the success of an MCRS is a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for system success.
The MCRS will be defined using a modified Boolean expression. The
simple grammar of requirements is shown in the traditional BackusCNaur
form in Figure 2-3.
<requirementS> ::= <conjunction> i <conjunction> OR <requirements>
<conjunction> ::= <atom>i I <atom> AND <conjunction> I (<requirements>)
<atom> ::= <integer> OF <type> I <integer> OF <group>
Figure 2-3: Grammar of Requirements
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2.9 Example
i •
In this example a multiprocessor system is described using ARM's
i_ tabular format in Table 2-2. Failure rates are assumed to be specified
_ in failures per million hours, all other rates are assumed to be on a
per hour basis. All rates default to zero and are assumed to follow a
single exponential distribution unless otherwise indicated. A multiple
_,! distribution rate is specified with a 'M' followed by the name of the
I
W_: file containing the necessary discriminating function and distribution
specifications. For the exponential distribution only its constant
I_ rate is given. The Weibull •distribution is specified wfth a 'W'
f followed by the scale and shape parameters. A general distribution•is
IiiI; specified with a 'G' followed by the name of the file containing the
,: necessary histogram.
_. The first component type described in Table 2-2 is a processor P with
_ the following characteristics:
hard failure rate: i = 200 failures per million hours
transient failure rate: oL= 10000 failures per million hours
i
i!
transient benign rate: 6 = 3600 per hour
ii intermittent failure rate: i = 10000 failures per million hours
_j
intermittent benign rate: _ = 3600 per hour
intermittent active rate: e = 360 per hour
coverage probability: C = I
repair rate•: _ = Weibull distribution of scale=1 ond shape=1.1
recovery rate: p = multiple rates defined in the file RECP
shadow rate: o = general distribution defined in the file SHADP
degradation rate: 8 = general distribution defined in the file DEGP
The PMS diagram of the multiprocessor is shown if Figure 2-4. The
multiprocessor has 10 LRU (Line Replaceable Units) clusters, LRU.I to
LRU.IO] LRU.i has a processor P.i, a memory M.i, and a watch dog timer
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Component Types (Section 2.1):
TYPE HARD TRANSIENT INTERMITTENT COVERAGE REPAIR RECOVERY SHADOW DEGRADATION
P 200 (10000, 3600) (20, 3600, 360) I W 1 1.1 M RECP G SHADP O DEGP
M 210 (10500, 3600) (21, 3600, 360) I W I 1.1 M RECM G SHADM G DEGM
WT 50 (2500, 3600) (5, 3600, 360) I W 1 1.1 M RECW G SHADW
B 10 (500, 3600) (I, 3600, 360) I W 1 1.1 M RECB G SHADB
WB I0 (500, 3600) (I, 3600, 360) I W 1 1.1 M RECWB G SHADWB
Redundant Groups (Section 2.2):
SIZE GROUPNAME REQUIREMENTS TYPE ADOPTS ADAPTATION
3 PTriad 2 OF 3 P PSimplex G ADAPTP
I PSimplex I OF I P
2 MTriad 2 OF 3 M MSimplex G ADAPTM
I MSimplex I OF I M
I WTriad 2 OF 3 WT WSimplex G ADAPTW
I WSimplex I OF I WT
I BTriad 2 OF 3 B
I WBTriad 2 OF 3 WB
System Watchdog Timers (Section 2.3): WTriad
PMS Structure (Section 2.4):
COM PONEN T TY PE NEIGHBORLCOMPONENTS
P.I-I0 P B.I-5, WB. I-5
M. I-I0 M B.I-5, WB. I-5
WT.I-IO WT B.I-5, WB. I-5
B.I-5 B P.I-I0, M.I-I0, WT.I-5
WB.I-5 WB P.I-I0, M.I-I0, WT.I-5
Intracomponent Port Connections (Section 2.5):
VERTEX TRANSMITER RECEI VER
B P M
B P WT
B M P
WB WT P
WB WT M
Intra Component-Type Communicators: (Section 2.6): P
Component Clusters (Section 2.7):
CLUSTERNAME COMPONENTS REQUIREMENTS
LRU.I-IO P.i, M.i, WT.i I OF M.i
Syste m Requirements (Section 2.8):
(I OF PTriad OR I OF PSimplex) AND (I OF MTriad OR I OF MSimplex)
Table 2-2: Multiprocessor System Description Example
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WT.i, and for any of its components to be available M.i must be working
properly. Components of the same type are grouped into 2 out of 3
triad subsystems.
The system uses adaptive hybrid redundancy so that if a component
other than a bus fails and there is only one triad without spares of
that component type, then it reconfigures the two remaining components
into a simplex (a single component emulating a triad) with a spare.
i The system must have a minimum of I processor triad or simplex, and I
memory triad or simplex to be operational.
!
_i Processor and memory triads transmit on a bus triad formed out of 5
!! buses, B.I to B.5. A processor triad can transmit to any kind of triad
i
i including another processor triad. A memory triad can only transmit to
i processor triads. The watchdog triad transmits on another bus triad
!
formed out of 5 buses, WB.I to WB.5. The watchdog triad can only
transmit to processor and memory triads.
_' LRU. I ..... LRU. I0
,t
i: w 0 7oi0r
i ......
B.I
B.2,-" ....
B.3
B.4
! .....
: B.5
_. WB. I
WB .2......
.................._,L,_,__,L_WB.3-L---L ......
•WB.4--L--'
WB. 5
Figure 2-4: PMS Diagram of Multiprocess0r Described in Table 2-2
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3. Automated Reliability Modeling Considerations
The ARM program will attempt to efficiently generate the system
reliability model based on the interconnectlon structure and the
operational requirements. The divide-and-conquer methodology was
selected to increase the computational efficiency and reduce the
program development complexity. The steps the ARM program is going to
follow in generating reliability models are shown in Table 3-I.
I) Interface with user and obtain system description.
2) Detect symmetries in the PMS graph.
3) Segment the PMS graph.
t
4) Identify the PMS system success and failure states based onthe
operational requirements.
5) Generate the models for the PMS graph segments.
6) Merge the models for the PMS graph segments.
7) Reduce the state space of the resulting model.
8) Format and output the state transition matrix of the model.
Table 3-I: Automated Reliability Modeling Steps
Steps 2 and 3 of Table 3-I have been implemented using algorithms
derived from those presented in Kini's dissertation [Kini 81] because
they are mature, well documented, and simple. The major research
effort will be the identification, analysis, and solution of the
fundamental problems in each of steps I, and 4 through 7 of Table 3-I.
The research will also include the development of efficient algorithms,
and methods to theoretically and experimentally validate the
algorithms.
The feasibility of the algorithms developed depends on their
efficiency due to the large number of states and transitions involved
in any reasonable structure. The validity of these algorithms is
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particularly important for life critical applications where a
probability of failure in the order 10-W is required.
The following sections will discuss the purpose and necessity Of
steps 2 through 7. Progress already made in identifying and analyzing
the problems involved, and developing and implementing algorithms to
solve them is also presented.
ilI 3.1 Deteotion of Symmetry in the PMS Graph
r Substructures in the PMS graph G will be considered symmetric if they
are isomorphic and the corresponding vertices of the two graphs have
identical component type labels. Symmetrical substructures willbe
assumed to be identical in function and reliability. Therefore the
reliability models of symmetrical substructures are identical. The
purpose of detecting symmetrical substructures is to avoid needless
duplication of effort by generating their reliability model only once.
These models will then be duplicated and merged to obtain the
reliability model of the system.
The symmetry detection algorithm ks shown in Appendix A.I. It is
based on the component type labels and the degree of the vertices in
_ the graph. The degree of a vertex is the number of neighbor vertices
it has. Two vertices are neighbors if they are interconnected.
The algorithm requires three steps to partition the vertex set_of a
labelled graph into equivalence classes whose vertices are symmetrical.
In the first step the partition is based on the component type label of
each vertex. For the second step the partition is based on the degree
of each vertex. The third step attempts to partition based on the
number of neighbors each vertex has in each equivalence class.
The last step must be repeated until there are no more changes in the
equivalence classes. The reason for this is that each partition
changes the number of neighbors in each equivalence class, and
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therefore other partitions may become necessary. In the worst case
this repetition will stop when each equivalence class has a single i
element.
Each class is related to other classes in a connectivity sense
because the vertices in the class are symmetrically connected to the
vertices in other classes. These equivalence classes and their
,i
connectivity relationships may be viewed as defining another graph G'.
The vertices of G' correspond uniquely to the equivalence classes in G.
Unlike the basic non-directed graph without self-loops, which was taken
to be the model for G, G' may have vertices which have self-loops.
This would be the result of a case in which vertices in the same
equivalence class are connected to each other in some symmetric
fashion, thus making the equivalence class its own neighbor. Also, the
number of links or connection density between two vertices of G' can be
greater than one. This would be the result of a case in which multiple
vertices in the same equivalence class are connected to one or more
vertices in another equivalence class.
3.2 Segmentation of the PMS Graph
The purpose of segmenting the PMS graph is to follow the divlde2and-
conquer methodology. The segmenting proceeds by searching for what are
termed Pendant Tree Subgraphs (PTS). These are maximal trees, that is
they are not part of another tree. In these tree subgraphs the slmple
path between any pair of vertices is the only path between those
vertices in the overall graph, in other words there are no cycles. It
is common to find PTS's in most PMS structures. In particular
input/output subsystems typically assume this character.
If the PMS interconnection graph G is not a PTS and all its PTS's,
excluding their roots, are removed then the remaining vertices and arcs
form a subgraph of G that is not tree-connected. This will be referred
to as the Kernel. The root of each PTS has dual status as member of
the PTS as well as the Kernel. The PTS's along with the Kernel form a
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natural set of segments of G on the basis of which the reliability
computation task may be divided.
The segmentation algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2. It discovers
the PTS's in a given PMS structure by collecting those leaf vertices of
G' which represent classes of leaf vertices of G (step I). These
"germinal trees" are then "grown" upward towards the root by adding on
neighboring vertices of these leaves (step 2), and merging the germinal
trees that overlap at their roots (step 3). Steps 2 and 3 continue
until no more adding of vertices or merging of trees is possible. At
this point a set of tree subgraphs of G' have been generated.
Depending on the number of vertices of G represented by the root, each
of these trees in G' may represent one PTS of G or a set of PTS's. In
the latter instance all PTS's in the set will be symmetric.
There are three "stopping conditions" under which a tree is not
capable of further growth, due to the fact that cycles would be formed
and it would no longer be a tree. The first condition is when the root
of the tree is a neighbor to itself. The second condition is when the
root of the tree has a single neighbor, which is not already in that
tree, with a connection density greater than one. The third condition
is when the tree has been merged with another tree that meets one of
the previous conditions.
3.3Identification of Success and Failure States
Depending on whether the system is operational or not the states in
the reliability model are termed success states or failure states
respectively. The identification of success and failure states is
essential during the generation of the reliability model because they
assume a very different form. Success states must have transitions to
other states, because the system must be able to reach a failure state
through some sequence of transitions. Failure states are trapping
states and therefore can not have any transitions to other states.
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The identification of failure states may also prevent some
unnecessary generation of failure states. The reason some failure
states are not needed is that the only way the system can arrive at
them is by being in another failure state.
For example, consider a system that requires 2 out of 3 processors to
be operational. For that system the failure state where all three
processors have failed does not have to be generated. The reason for
this is thatthe only way the system can arrive at that state is by
being in another failure state where two processors have failed.
An algorithm to identify success and failure states has already been
developed and implemented. This algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3.
It traverses the system requirements parse tree searching for some way
in which a system state can satisfy the requirements. The system state
is assumed to include those components that are not operational because
they do not have communication paths, due to the failure of other
components. The Boolean expression of requirements is assumed to have
been transformed into a sum-of-products form so that it does not
contain any parenthesis.
The parse tree of a sum-of'products Boolean expression only has three
• levels. The bottom level•represents atomic requirements such as "2 of
processors". The intermediate level represents pure conjunctive
requirements, that is an AND expression of atomic requirements. The
top level represents the sum-of-products expression of the system
requirements, that is an OR expression of pure conjunctive
requirements.
For example, consider a system that can operate with either one
processor and two memories, or with one processor, one disk, and one
memory. For readability the symbol _(N,X) will represent the atomic
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requirement "N of X". The sum-of-products expression of the system
requirements is
_(I,P) AND _(2,M) OR _(I,P) AND _(I,D) AND _(I,M) (3.1)
The parse tree of such an expression is shown in Figure 3-I.
The algorithm is a Boolean function that takes a state as an argument
and returns true if it is a success state. The algorithm works at
three levels that correspond to the levels of the parse tree. At the•
first level it will return true if any conjunctive requirement, in the
sum-of-products expression of system requirements, is meet. At the
second level it will return true if all atomic requirements in a
conjunction are meet. The third level determines which atomic
requirements are meet.
L
OR
/ \
/ \
AND AND
I \ / I \/ \ / I \
_(I ,P) _(2,M) _IJ(1,P) _(I ,D) _(I ,M)
Figure 3-I: Parse tree of requirement expression (3 I)
3.4 Generation of Models for PMS Graph Segments ..
The generation of the system reliability model will also follow the
divide-and-conquer methodology. For that purpose, the states and
transitions corresponding to the different segments of the equivalence
class graph G', will be separately generated and then merged to produce
the system reliability model. The generation of states and transitions
in the model will be implemented using algorithms derived from the
model generation algorithm presented in [Butler 85].
An algorithm for what are termed minimal subtrees of PTS's has
already been developed and implemented. This algorithm is shown in
Appendix A.4. Minimal subtrees of PTS's are those that are below the
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minimum system requirements or meet them exactly. When the root of a
minimal subtree of a PTS fails all the nodes in that minimal subtree
fai! because none of the subtrees within it, which become isolated from
other nodes in the graph, can meet the system requirements by itself.
This algorithm is limited to hard faults in non-redundant and non-
repairable minimal subtrees. The steps the algorithm follows in
generating the minimal subtree models are shown in Table 3-2.
The minimal subtree model generation algorithm must be extended to
redundant and repairable minimal subtrees which are susceptible to
transient and intermittent faults. Two more algorithms must be
developed to generate the system reliability model. The f_rst
algorithm will generate a model for those nodes of a PTS that are not
in a minimal subtree, and merge it with the minimal subtree models to
produce the PTS model. The second algorithm will generate a model for
the kernel and merge it with the PTS models to produce the system
reliability model.
I) Initialize the set of new states New Set to the start state.
2) While the New Set is not empty, get a state out of the New Set
until a success state is found.
3) For every equivalence class node in the minimal subtree, if more
components of this class can fail then generate the transitions
out of the success state.
4) For every transition generated:
a) If the destination state is new then add it to the New Set.
D
b) Add the transition to the model by obtaining the two factors
whose product is the transition's rate: the number of working _
components in the class whose failure is described by the i
transition, and their failure rate.
: Table 3-2: Minimal Subtree Modeling Steps
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3.5 Merging of Models for PMS Graph Segments
For the purpose of following the divide-and-conquer methodology, the
models of the segments of the equivalence class graph G' will be merged
to generate the PTS models and also the system reliability model. When
two models with N and M states are merged the resulting model has at
most NM states. All the states in the original models and their
incoming transitions appear in the resulting model along with new ones.
Table 3-3 shows the steps that must be followed to merge two models.
Algorithms that follow these steps must be developed and implemented to
generate the PTS models and also the system reliability model.
I) Retain only one of the two identical start states.
2) Retain all the other original states, which amount to N . M - 2
states.
3) Produce at most NM - N - M + I new states by combining each
original state in one model with all the original states in the
other model, except for the start states.
Table 3-3: Two Model Merging Steps
3.6 Reduction of the State Space
The use of time-varying Markov models to analyze complex systems runs
into three problems when the state space becomes extremely iarge.
First, the models become intractable for any human, but this can be
alleviated by the use of computer aided modeling and evaluation tools
such as the ARM program and others already discussed. Second, the
computational cost of evaluating the model may become prohibitive.
Third, the evaluation of the model using certain computer systems may
become impossible due to their memory space limitations. For the
purpose of alleviating the last two problems the user of the ARM
program will have the option of applying a state space reduction
technique to the system reliability model.
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The number of states can be reduced by merging them into subsets and
computing the equivalent transition rates between the subsets [Singh
72]. The equivalent transition rate between subsets A and B is
IAB = _ I.. for any icA (3 2)j_B ij
where lij is the transition rate from state i in subset A to state j in
subset B. State merging must follow two conditions. First, the
equivalent transition rate given by equation (3.2) must be the same for
any state i in subset A. Second, the probabilities of all the states
merged into a subset must be equal.
The number of states can also be reduced by deleting states with a
relatively low probability. Two techniques that can be used for this
purpose are called state space truncation [Singh 72] and sequential
truncation [Singh 75].
State space truncation must follow two conditions. First, the
biggest probability in the truncated state space should be less that
the smallest probability in t_e remaining state space. Second, after
the states have been truncated, the states transition diagram should be
examined to see if the process of truncation hasgenerated any new
absorbing states. Either the new absorbing states should be deleted or
the states whose truncation has generated this new absorbing states
should be retalned. In systems consisting of N identical components
with two states these conditions are not hard to achieve. The state
space may be divided into N + I subsets, each subset having states of a
certain level of coincident failures. At first an arbitrary level of
truncation should be selected. The computation can then be repeated by
including the next subset. If the new values are not significantly
different from the previous ones, the computation can be stopped,
otherwise one more subset should be included and the computations
repeated. This should be extensible to systems with different types of
components which are susceptible to transient and intermittent faults.
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In sequential truncation the state probabilities are calculated every
time a hew state is generated and states with probabilities less than a
reference value are deleted. This method consumes more computation
time than state space truncation but does not have to be repeated to
insure the accuracy of the approximation.
The state space truncation technique can be extended to produce a
conservative estimate. The states with a certain level of coincident
failures can be made failure states. This eliminates the out going
transitions of the new failure states, and truncates those states that
could only be reached through the new failure states. This will
produce a conservative estimate because the truncated states will also
be analyzed as though they were failure states.
Only the extended state space truncation technique is applicable to
the ARM program. The reason for this is that the ARM program will not
be evaluating the reliability model. State space truncation will be
attempted during the generation of the models for the PMS graph
segments. Algorithms that follow this technique must be developed and
implemented.
4O
4. Automated Reliability Modeling Examples
Currently the ARM program is limited to systems that are non C
redundant and non-repairable minimal subtrees, and are not susceptible
to transient or intermittent faults. Only the three minimum ARM input
categories have been implemented. These input categories are: the hard
failure rate of the component types, the interconnection structure, and
the system requirements. Only the output format for the SURE program
has been implemented. The Cm* multiprocessor architecture described in
[Swan 77] will be used to illustrate the current capabilities of the
ARM program.
The Cm* multiprocessor architecture is based on the LSI-11
microcomputer. Figure 4-I shows one possible version of the
architecture. Each computer module (Cm) is composed of one processor
module connected via an interface (Slocal) to one or more memory
modules. The memories in the structure collectively realize the
virtual address space shared by the processors. Each cluster is
composed of a cluster controller (Kmap) and two or more Cms. The
Slocal controls local memory access and passes external references
(i.e. to memory elsewhere in the cluster or in a different cluster) to
the Kmap. The Kmaps are mapping controllers which allow processors in
Cms to access memory elsewhere in the cluster or in other clusters via
the Intercluster Buses (B in the figure). The components marked L in
the figure are interfaces from the Kmaps to the Intercluster Buses.
The following sections will illustrate the automatic generation of
reliability models by modeling several versions of the Cm*
architecture. The sensitivity of the models generated to the system
requirements and the PMS interconnection graph is demonstrated. To
validate the models generated they will be evaluated using the SURE
program, and compared with the results of manually derived probability
of failure equations. The exponential failure rates used to evaluate
the models where obtained from [Siewiorek 78] and are reproduced in
Table 4-I.
41
B B
I\ / \
/ \. / \
L L L L
Kmap Kmap Kmap
/\ /\ /\
. I \ I \ I \
Slocal Slocal Slocal Slocal Slocai Slocal
/ ', / ', / \ /t\ /1\ / ',
P M M P M M P M M P M M P M M P M M
Key:
B Intercluster Bus Slocai Local Switch
L Intercluster Bus Interface P Processor
Kmap Mapping Controller M Memory
Figure 4-I: Cm* Architecture
Processor 29.893E-6
Memory 46.278E-6
Local Switch 24.059E-6
Mapping Controller 130.935E-6
Intercluster Bus Interface 34.836E-6
Intercluster Bus O.O00E-6
Table 4-I: Failure Rates of Cm* Modules
4.1Cm* Computer Module
The Cm* computer module to be modeled is composed of one processor,
module connected via an interface (Slocal) t•o three memory modules •.
The PMS diagram of the Cm* computer module is shown in Figure 4-2.
Slocal
_IIi\_
/ / \ \
P M M M
Figure 4-2: Cm* Computer Module
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The model ARM automatically generated when the Cm* computer module in
Figure 4-2 requires one processor and one memory to perform its
function is shown in Fig_e 4-3. Only states I, 4, and 6 are not
failure states. The computer module will fail if three memories fail,
or if any single component other than a memory fails. The system
starts in state I with all its components working. The probability of
failure, during the first ten hours of operation, obtained from this
model is 5.39375E-4.
_ Q
/
Key : State Failed components
I None
2 I S
3 I P
4 I M
i 5 I M& I P
6 2M
7 2M & I P
8 3M
Figure 4-3: Model of Figure 4-2 Cm* Requiring I P & I M
The equatlon for the probability of failure Pf is
Pf = I - RsRp(R3 + ..2 m)2) "m 3_m(I - Rm) . 3Rm(1 - R (4.1)
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where Rs, Rp, and Rm are the reliability functions of a local switch, a
processor, and a memory. The R3 term corresponds •to the state in which
m
all three memories function. The 3R2(I - Rm) term corresponds to the
state in which one memory failed and two are functional. The
- 3Rm(1 - Rm )2 term corresponds to the state in which two memories failed
and one is functional. The probability of failure, during the first
" ten hours of operation, obtained from this equation is 5.39375E-4.
This is the same result obtained from the model in Figure 4-3.
4.2 Effect of the System Requirements
The number of components N required for a system to perform its
function affects both the number of states and the probability of
failure. The number _of states is a non-increasing function of N. The
probability of failure is a non-decreasing function of N.
For example, the model ARM automatically generated when the
requirements of the Cm* computer module in Figure 4-2 are increased to
I processor and 2 memories is shown in Figure 4-4. Only states I and 4•
are not failure states. The computer module will fail if two memories
fail, or if any single component other than a memory fails. The system
starts in state I •with all its components working. Comparing this
model to the one shown in Figure 4-3, the number of states decreased to
six and the probability of failure, during the firstten hours of
operation, •increased to 5.40016E-4.
The equation for the probability of failure Pf is
Pf = I - RsRp(R _ + 3R_(I - Rm)) (4"2)
. where Rs, Rp, and Rm are the reliability functions of a local switch, a
processor, and a memory. The R3 term corresponds to the state in which
m
- all three memories function. The 3R_(I - Rm) term corresponds to the
state in which one memory failed and two are functional. The
probability of failure, during the first ten hours of operation,
obtained from this equation is 5.40016E-4. This is the same result
obtained from the model in Figure 4-4.
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Key : State Failed components
I None
2 I S
3 I P
4 IM
5 IM& I P
6 2M
Figure 4-4: Model of Figure 4-2 Cm* Requiring I P & 2 M
4.3 Cm* Cluster
The Cm* cluster to be modeled is composed of three computer modules
connected via a cluster controller (Kmap). Each computer module is
composed of one processor module connected via an interface (Slocal) to
two memory modules. The PMS diagram of the Cm* cluster is shown in
Figure 4-5.
Kmap
/ \
Slocal Slocal Slocal
I , \ I \
P M M P M M P M M
Figure 4-5: Cm* Cluster
The model ARM automatically generated when the Cm* cluster in
Figure 475 requires 2 processors and 5 memories to perform itg function
is shown in Figure 4-6. All the failure states have been collapsed
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into state 2. The cluster will fail if two memories or two processors
fail. The system starts in state I with all its components working.
In state 5 one processor and one memory in the same computer module
E
have failed, therefore if their local switch fails no other components
will be affected. In state 6 one processor and one memory in a
different computer module have failed, therefore if a local switch
fails other components will also be affected. The probability of
failure, during the first ten hours of operation, obtained from this
model is 2.03253E-3.
Key: State Failed components
I None
2 I K or I S or 2 P or 2 M
3 I P
- 4 I M
5 I M & I P in the same Cm
6 I M & I P in a different Cm
Figure 4-6: Model Of Figure 4-5 Cm* Requiring 2 P & 5 N -
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The equation for the probability of failure Pf is
Pf = I -R'R3(R3Ks p + 3R_(I -Rp))(R6m + 6R5(1m -Rm)) (4.3)
where Rs, Rp, and Rm are the reliability functions of a local switch, a
processor, and a memory. The R3 term corresponds to the state in which
• pall three processors function. The 3R (I - Rp) term corresponds to the
state in which one processor failed and two are functional. The R6
m
term corresponds to the state in which all six memories function. The
6R_(I - Rm) term corresponds to the state in which one memory failed
and five are functional. The probability of failure, during the first
ten hours of operation, obtained from this equation is 2.03253E-3.
This is the same result obtained from the model in Figure 4-6.
4/4 Effect of the PMS Interconnection
The PMS interconnection affects both the number of states and the
probability of failure. For example, let us change the PMS
interconnection of the Cm* cluster in Figure 4-5 so that two computer
modules are composed of one processor and one memory, and the third
computer module is composed of one processor and four memories. The
resulting PMS diagram of the Cm* cluster is shown in Figure 4-7.
Kmap
zi\
/ I \
Slocal. Slocal I Slocal_
" \ " \ _"1
I \ I \ I I \ \
PI MI PI MI P2 M2 M2 M2 M2
Figure 4-7: Nonsymmetrical connection of Figure 4-5 Cm* Cluster
The model ARM automatically generated when the Cm* cluster in
Figure 4-7 requires 2 processor and 5 memories to perform its function
is shown in Figure 4-8. All the failure states have been collapsed
into state 2. The cluster will fail if two memories or two processors
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fail. The system starts in state I with all its components working.
._ Comparing this model to the one shown in Figure 4-6, the number of
states increased to twelve and the probability of failure, during the
first ten hours of operation, decreased to 1.55366E-3.
The equation for the probability of failure Pf is
_--'-_k__ +_ (_-__ +_-_m_-. _. C_-_ _,._
where Rs, Rp, and Rm are the reliability functions of a local switch, a
processor, and a memory. The only difference between this equation and
R2(I - Rs)R R term This termequation (4.3) is the addition of the 2Rk s
corresponds to the state in which one local switch SI failed and the
other two local switches are functional. The probability of failure,
i
during the first ten hours 'of operation, obtained from this equation is
1.55366E-3. This is the same result obtained from the model in Figure
428.
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Key: State Failed components State Failed components
I None 7 I M2
2 I K, I S2, 2 P, or 2 M 8 I P! & M.l in the same Cm
3 I SI & I P! & I MI 9 l P! & M. in a different Cm
4 I P! 10 I P! & 11M-
5 I MI 11 I P2 & I M2 "
6 I P2 12 I P2 & I M2
Figure 4-8: Mode! of Figure 4-7 Cm* Requiring 2 P & 5 M
49
5. Plans for Future Work
The architectures and fault _.ypes the research will address will
increase in complexity in phases as described below. The reason for
breaking the research work into phases is to keep the complexity of the
problem being addressed at a manageable level. The results of each
phase of the research will be theoretically and experimentally
validated before proceeding to the next phase. The ARM program will be
used as part of the experimental validation of each phase. Next the
performance and range of applications of the ARM program must be
evaluated. Based on the results of the validation and evaluation the
approach will be reformulated as necessary.
The first phase Of the research will address hard faults, and non-
redundant and non-repairable PMS tree structures that require their
root to be operational. This phase will only involve research into
steps I, 4, and 5 of Table 3-I. All subsequent phases will involve
research into steps I, and 4 through 7 of Table 3-I.
Phase two of the research will address hard faults and non-redundant
general structures with no repair. The third phase of the research
will address hard faults, and dynamically redundant architectures that
can have imperfect coverage, and repair. Examples of such
architectures are a multiprocessor at CMU, named Cm* [Swan 77], and the
Electronic Switching Systems (ESS) used in the Bell System [Toy 78].
Cm* and ESS will be used in the experimental validation of this phase/
Phase four _ of the research will address hybrid redundant
architectures but only for hard faults. The fifthand last phase of
" the research will address intermittent, transient, and hard faults.
For the last two phases the architectures used for experimental
validation will be the Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor (FTMP) at NASA's
Langley Research Center [Lala 83], an Intel 432 [Siewiorek 82] based
multiprocessor, Cm*, and ESS.
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6. Conclusion
The previous sections presented an approach for automatic Markov
reliability and availability modeling of computer architectures. This
approach consists of eight steps which were summarized in Table 3-I.
The Automated Reliability Modeling (ARM) program is being developed to
implement these steps. The first step is to obtain a system
description consisting of the Processor-Memory-Swi tch (PMS)
interconnection graph, the behavior of the PMS components, the fault-
tolerant Strategies, and the operational requirements. Section 2
described the eight input categories currently envisioned for the
system description method of the ARM program. These input categories
are capable of describing most of the current computer architectures.
The other steps generate the Markov model from this System
descripLion. Section 3 discussed the purpose and necessity of these
steps. Progress already made in identifying and analyzing the problems
involved, and developing and implementing algorithms to solve them was
also presented.
Section 4 presented examples of the current capabilities of the ARM
program. The sensitivity of the models generated to the system
requirements and the PMS interconnection graph was also demonstrated.
Section 5 presented the current plans for extending the capabilities of
the ARM program to include all of the steps in Table 3-I.
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A. ARM Program Algorithms
A.I Symmetry Detection Algorithm
Function definitions:
Split class(R, C, L) - If relation R is not satisfied it then
partitions class C and creates a new class after the last class L.
Returns the number of equivalence classes.
Size(C) - Returns the number of elements in the vertex equivalence
class C.
Element(E, C) - Returns element E of the vertex equivalence class C.
Equivalent(E, C, R) - True if element E of class C is equivalent in
terms of relation R to the preceding class elements.
Equal Degree(E, C) ' True if element E of class C has the same degree
as the _receding elements of class C.
Equal_Neighbor Classes(E, C) - True if element E of class C has the
same number of neighbors in each class as the preceding elements of
class C.
procedure Symmetry;
function Equivalent(Current Element, Class, Relation);
begin -
if Relation = Degree then
return Equal_Degree(Current Element, class)
else return Equal_Neighbor_Class_s(Current_Element, Class);
end;
function Split_Class(Relation, This_class, Last_class);
begin
Split := false;
for I := 2 to Size(This Class) do
begin
Current Element := Element(I, This Class);
" if not Equivalent(Current_Element,-This_class, Relation) then
begin
• if not Split then
begin
Split := true;
Last Class := Last Class + I;
( Create a new Last class with the degree and neighbor
attributes of the Current element of This class. );
end;
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( Move the Current_Element of This_class to the Last class. );
end;
end;
return Last Class;
end; { Split C_ass }
begin { Symmetry }
{ Step I: Split based on equal type. }
Last Class :: Last Type;
for _ :: I to Last Class do
( Add elements of type I to class I. );
{ Step 2: Split based on equa± degree. }
I :: I;
while I <-- Last Class do
n
begin
Last Class := Split Class(Degree, i, Last Class);
I ::I + I;
end;
{ Step 3: Split based on equal neighbor classes. }
New_Last :--Last Class;
Done :--false;
while not Done do
begin
for I :-- I to Last Class do
New Last := SplTt Class(Neighbors, I, New Last);
if Las_ Class _ New Last then
Done :_ true
else Last_Class :--New_Last;
end;
end; { Symmetry }
A.2 Segmentation Algorithm
Funct ion def ini tions :
Degree(C) - Returns the degree of class C.
Root(T) - Returns the root of tree T. i
Neighbors(C) - Returns the set of neighbors of class C.
Up_Neighbors(C) - Returns the number of neighbors of class C that are
not already in the tree of which class C is the root.
53
Up Degree(C) - Returns the degree of connectivity of class C with
neighbors that are not already in the tree of which class C is the
root.
Variable definitions:
Dead[T] - True when tree T has been merged intoanother tree. All
the array is initialized as false.
Complete[T] - True when tree T is not capable of further growth. All
the array is initialized as false.
procedure Segmentation;
begin
{ Step I: Collect the germinal trees, that is the leaf vertices Of
G' which represent classes of leaf vertices of G. }
Last Tree := O;
for _ :_ I to Last class do
if Degree(I) _ I then
begin
Last Tree :_ Last Tree . I;
( InTtialize the _ast Tree with class i as its root and
single node. );
end;
{ Continue growing the germinal trees (steps 2 and 3) until no more
adding of vertices or merging of trees is possible. }
Changes :: true;
while Changes do
begin
Changes := false;
{ Step 2: Grow these germinal trees upward by adding on
neighboring vertices of these leaves. }
for I := I to Last Tree do
if not Dead[I] and not Complete[I] then
° { Stopping condition I: The root is a neighbor _o itself. }
• if Root(I) in Neighbors(I) then
Complete[I] := true
else if Up_Neighbors(I) = I then
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{ Stopping condition 2: The root has a single
neighbor outside of the tree with density greater
than one. }
if Up_Degree(I) = I then
begin
( Grow the tree by adding the root's unique
neighbor, outside of the tree, with density
of one as its new root. );
Changes :=true;
end
else Complete[I] := true;
{ Step 3: Merge the germinal trees that overlap at their roots. }
for i := I to Last Tree do
if not Dead[I] then
for J := I + I to Last Tree do
if not Dead[J] then-
if Root(I) = Root(J) then
begin
( Merge tree J into tree I. );
Changes := true;
Dead[J] := true;
{ Stopping condition 3: The tree is merged with
another tree that meets conditions I or 2. }
if Complete[J] then
Complete[I] := true;
end;
end; { while Changes }
end; { Segmentation }
A.3 Success and Failure State Identification Algorithm
Variable definitions:
Last Conjunction - The number of conjunctions in the sum-of-products
expressTon of system requirements.
Last Atom[I] - The number of atomic requirements in conjunction I.
Classes[I][J] - The set of equivalence classes whose components a_e
of the type specified by atomic requirement J of conjunction I.
•Max Dead[I][J] - The maximum number of components, of the type
specifTed by atomic requirement J of conjunction I, that can fail and
t_e system remain operational.
State[K] - The number of components in class K that have failed when
the system is in this state.
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function Success(State); { True if its argument is a success state. }
begin
I := I;
Alive := false;
{ Level I: If any conjunctive requirement, in the sum-of-products
expression of system requirements, is meet then this is a success
state. }
while not Alive and I <= Last_Conjunction do
begin
J := I;
Alive := true;
{ Level 2: If all atomic requirements in a conjunction are meet
then this is a success state. }
while Alive and J <--Last Atom[I] do
begin
K := I;
Dead := 0;
{ Level 3: Count the number of components Of the specified
type that have failed and if it does not exceed the maximum
value then the state meets the atomic requirement. }
while Alive and K <= Last Class do
begin
if K in Classes[I][J] then
begin
Dead :--Dead + State[K];
if Dead > Max Dead[I][J] then
Alive := false;
end;
K:=K + I;
end; "
J :=J + I;
end;
I :=I + I;
end; { while not Alive }
Success := Alive;
end; { Success }
A.4 Minimal Subtree Model Generation Algorithm
Function definitions:
Get_State(N) - Returns a state from the set of new states N and
removes it from the set.
Success(S) - True if state S is a success state.
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Class(T) -Returns the equivalence class of node T of the minimal
subtree.
Size(C) - Returns the number of elements in the equivalence class C.
New State(S) - True if state S is a new state.
m
Lambda(C) - Returns the failure rate of components in class C.
Vari able def initions :
State[C] - The number of components in class C that have failed when
the system is in this state.
Last Node - The number of nodes in the minimal subtree.
Subtree[I][C] -The number of components in class C that are in
subtree I of the mfnimal subtree.
Next[I][C] - The number of components in class C that have failed
When the system reaches its next state I.
Working[I][J] - The number of working components in the class whose
failure is described by the transition from state I to state J.
Failure Rate[I][J] - The failure rate of the class of component
whose fail_re is described by the transition from state I to state J.
procedure Model Subtree(Subtree, LastNode);
begin
{ Step I: Initialize New Set to the start state. }
for I := I to Last Class do
State[I] := 0;
New Set := [State];
{ Step 2 : While the New Set is not empty, get a state out of the
New Set until a success state is found. }
while New Set <> [] do
begin
State := Get State(New Set);
if Success(STate) then-
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{ Step 3: For every node in the minimal subtree, if more
components of this class can fail then generate the
transitions out of the success state. }
for I := I to Last Node do
m
begin
C :: Class(Subtree[I]) ;
if State[C] < Size(C) then
begin
Num States :--O;
If Ta node subtree has all its components working) then
begin
(generate a transition for one such subtree failure);
Num States :--Num States + I;
D
end;
For J := I to (number of subtrees with a different set
of failed components) do
begin
(generate a transition for the failure of subtree J);
Num States :--Num States + J;
end;
{ Step 4: For every transition generated: }
for J := I to Num States do
begin
{ Substep 4a: If the destination state is new Lhen
add it to the New Set. }
if New State(Next[J]) then
New Set :: New Set + Next[J];
{ Substep 4b: Add the transition to the model. }
if J = I then
Working[State] [Next[J]] :=
Size(C) - State[C] - Num States +
else Working[State][Next[J]] := I;
FailureRate[State][Next[J]] := Lambda(C);
end;
end; { if more can fail }
end; { for all nodes in minimal subtree }
end; { while the set of new states is not empty }
" end; { Model Subtree }
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